Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? by Jan Boone & Jan C. van Ours
De Economist (2012) 160:413–438
DOI 10.1007/s10645-012-9187-8
Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit
Exhaustion?
Jan Boone · Jan C. van Ours
Published online: 10 April 2012
© The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to intro-
duce a “spike” in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current
theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model
in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates
are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume
that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these
jobs are permanent. This gives some workers an incentive to not immediately start
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working after they have found a job. Instead they wait until their benefits expire.
We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find
supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that
workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.
Keywords Unemployment benefits · Spikes
JEL Classification J22 · I31 · J16
1 Introduction
In theory, unemployment benefits provide a disincentive to benefit recipients. The
greater the level of benefits relative to the expected wage, the less costly the period
of the job search, so workers tend to search for jobs less intensely and tend to remain
unemployed longer. Putting a limit on the duration of benefits tends to speed up the job
search. As the date approaches when benefits will expire, unemployed workers may
increase the intensity of their job search and thereby the rate of job-finding. Moreover,
many empirical studies find that the exhaustion of benefits creates a “spike” in the
exit rate from unemployment. Usually, these spikes are found as a “by-product” of
an analysis focusing on the relationship between potential benefit duration (PBD) and
exit rates from unemployment.
Moffitt (1985) is an example of an early US study finding benefit exhaustion spikes.
He analyzes administrative unemployment insurance records from the Continuous
Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) database. As Moffitt indicates the main advantage
of administrative data is the high accuracy, while the main disadvantage is that the
variable of interest, the duration of UI benefits is truncated at the point of maximum
benefits. Most individuals in his data have a maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks
but some individuals are entitled to extended benefits up to 13 weeks. Moffitt finds
that the unemployment exit rate at 26 weeks is 3 times the exit rate one month before
benefit expiration. At 39 weeks there is a spike in the exit rate which is about 2 times
the regular exit rate. Meyer (1990) analyzes the same CWBH data as Moffitt using
a more extensive statistical model finding similar results: the exit rate in the week
before benefit exhaustion is about twice the size of the usual exit rate. Katz and Meyer
(1990a) use two datasets, the CWBH dataset and data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The results concerning the spike at benefit exhaustion using the CWBH
data are similar to previous studies: in the week of benefit expiration the exit rate is
about 80 % higher. The survey data allow for a distinction between transitions to jobs
at the previous employer (recalls) and transitions to new jobs. In both cases there is
a substantial increase in the job finding rate close to benefit exhaustion.1 Katz and
Meyer (1990b) use CWBH data supplemented with telephone interviews to provide
additional information. They find spikes in the job finding rates in the exhaustion week
which are 2.2–2.3 times the usual job finding rate, both for recalls and new jobs. Card
1 Katz and Meyer also show that such spikes are not present for UI non-recipients.
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and Levine (2000) analyze administrative data from the New Jersey Extended Benefit
Program. They find that the exit rate in the week of benefit exhaustion is about twice
as large as the regular exit rate.
There are also quite a few European studies that find spikes near benefit exhaus-
tion. Carling et al. (1996) analyze Swedish data and find a big increase in the
outflow from unemployment to labor market programs whereas the increase in the
exit rate to employment is substantially smaller. Roed and Zhang (2003) find for
Norwegian unemployed that the exit rate out of unemployment increases sharply in
the months just prior to benefit exhaustion with the effect being larger for females
than for males. Adamchik (1999) finds a strong increase in re-employment prob-
abilities around benefit expiration in Poland. Lalive et al. (2006) analyze Austrian
social security data finding large spikes in the exit rate out of unemployment
at benefit exhaustion. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) studying PBD reductions
in Slovenia find both strong effects on the exit rate out of unemployment and
substantial spikes around benefit exhaustion; the spikes in the job finding rate
in the month prior to benefit exhaustion are 2.2–2.5 times as high as the usual
job finding rate. In a recent study that focuses exclusively on the end-of-ben-
efit spike phenomenon Card et al. (2007) find that the unemployment exit rate
increases much more than the re-employment hazard rate does. Their main con-
clusion is that the spike in unemployment-exit rates is to a large extent due to
measurement error. Researchers mistake leaving the unemployment register for job
finding.
Part of the criticism by Card et al. (2007) on previous studies may be valid as
some studies are based on unemployment exits up to point of benefit exhaustion only.
But, there are also studies focusing on job finding rates that provide evidence on the
existence of benefit exhaustion spikes. This indicates that the benefit exhaustion spike
is more than a statistical artifact. As we discuss in more detail in the next section
theoretical work based on non-stationary search theory explains the increase in the
job finding rate towards benefit exhaustion (Mortensen 1977 and Van den Berg 1990).
However, these studies do not explain why it falls again after expiration, which is
needed to get a spike.2
Spikes in unemployment hazards are generally not accounted for in standard search
models where agents are forward-looking. This follow trivially from the recursive
nature of the solution to a Bellman equation. As a consequence, in order to account
for spikes, it is necessary to amend the standard models. Our contribution to the litera-
ture is twofold. First, we provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of benefit
exhaustion spikes, which are caused by delays in job acceptance. Our theoretical
model suggests that spikes in job finding rates are more likely to occur for perma-
nent jobs than for temporary jobs. Our theoretical model is not intended to replace
existing theories of job search. We introduce an element in job acceptance behavior
2 Suggested explanations for the benefit spike include the strategic timing of job starting dates and implicit
contracts between unemployed workers and their previous employers, in which the employers rehire the
workers at about the time their benefits expire (Card and Levine 2000). However, these are notions rather
than formalized theories. Also, the explanation provided by Card and Levine (2000) is very much related
to the US labor market as in almost all European labor markets temporary layoffs do not occur.
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that allows us to explain a phenomenon that cannot be explained in traditional search
theory. Second, we use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this pre-
diction. The information in this dataset is not restricted to leaving unemployment but
includes information about job finding. In fact, we are able to distinguish between
finding of permanent and temporary jobs. The existence of end-of-benefit spikes per
se in Slovenia has been shown before but this was a by-product of an analysis on the
impact of changes in potential benefit duration on job finding rates (Van Ours and
Vodopivec (2006)). Here, we focus on the nature of the benefit exhaustion spikes.
We show that indeed these spikes are more important in transitions from unemploy-
ment to permanent jobs than they are in transitions from unemployment to temporary
jobs.
This paper is set-up as follows. In Sect. 2 we present our theoretical model in which
individuals optimize the delay in job acceptance. In a stationary labor market the job
finding rate equals the job offer arrival rate, but initially, because of the delay period
no jobs are accepted. When an individual approaches benefit expiration the delay is
reduced as no individual will want to accept a job offer beyond the point of benefit
expiration. This delay behavior causes a spike at the point of benefit expiration. Delays
in accepting job offers will not always occur. In case of temporary jobs delaying the
start will not be acceptable to firms. Therefore, in the transition rate to temporary
jobs an end of benefit spike is less likely to occur. In Sect. 3 we discuss our data and
present some stylized facts. Using data from the Slovenian unemployment register we
present “eyeball” evidence supporting our delay theory. Section 4 presents the results
of our empirical analysis. We investigate whether job finding spikes at benefit exhaus-
tion are smaller for temporary jobs. We find that this is indeed the case. Section 5
concludes.
2 Optimal Delay in Job Acceptance: Theory
We aim to explain the spike in the outflow from unemployment around the time the
unemployment benefit expires. Therefore, we cannot use stationary models where
unemployment benefits are paid irrespective of unemployment duration (or where the
benefit entitlement is lost with an constant probability per period). We assume that
for a duration T the unemployed worker is entitled to unemployment benefits b > 0.
After expiration the benefits drop to a social assistance level bs < b.
Two well known papers on nonstationarity in job search theory are Mortensen
(1977) and Van den Berg (1990). In this setting, Van den Berg (1990) implies that
the job acceptance probability increases with duration, jumps up at time T and stays
(that) high thereafter. Intuitively, if the benefit has dropped (to zero) the value of unem-
ployment becomes so low that almost any job becomes acceptable. This reduces the
reservation wage and hence increases the job acceptance rate. Thus, this analysis does
not explain a spike in exit rates at T as the exit rate does not fall after T .
Mortensen’s (1977) model can explain a spike if one is willing to assume that
income and leisure are substitutes. In that case, acceptance rates increase with dura-
tion and drop (discontinuously) at T to a lower level. As the benefit drops to zero,
leisure substitutes for income thereby reducing search effort (which takes up leisure
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time). In the case where leisure and income are complements (leisure is more enjoy-
able if there is more money to spend), the acceptance probability jumps up at T and
stays high thereafter. We find the assumption that income and leisure are complements
more convincing since this is in line with all literature on the effects of the level of
benefits on the job finding rate.3 Moreover, even in the case of substitutes, it is not
clear why these effects would differ for different type of jobs.
There are also studies that use a static labor supply theory to motivate the existence
of an end-of-benefit spike. Then, it is assumed that a new job can be found at any
time (Meyer 1990; Moffitt and Nicholson 1982). At the time a worker loses his job
he decides on consumption and the duration of unemployment subject to a budget
constraint. At the expiration date T the budget constraint is kinked and hence many
indifference curves are tangent at the kink. Therefore, many individuals choose to
leave unemployment at benefit expiration, which explains the spike in the outflow
rate at T . However, this static model is less suitable as a framework to study benefit
exhaustion spikes because it does not explain why the size of the spike depends on the
type of job. As we show below in our empirical analysis benefit exhaustion spikes are
larger for permanent than for temporary jobs. In fact, one can argue that in the Meyer
(1990) and Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) framework to the extent that temporary jobs
are easier to find than permanent jobs, this theory would predict a larger spike for
temporary jobs.4
The two traditional theoretical explanations for the existence of a benefit exhaustion
spike cannot explain why there would be a difference between spikes for temporary
and permanent jobs.5 We propose a model where firms and workers are matched and
then decide on the wage and the starting date of the job. We first describe the firm
side of the story and then move on to the worker. Then we show how a delay in the
starting date generates a spike in the outflow rate which is different in magnitude for
temporary and permanent jobs.
3 Note that the case of income and leisure being substitutes would imply that an increase in unemployment
benefits increases the job finding rate. A prediction that is clearly at odds with empirical research (see for
example Atkinson and Micklewright 1991).
4 Note that the story in Meyer (1990) and Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) is not necessarily dynamically
consistent. When a worker loses his job, a “holiday” of T periods looks nice enough, but a week before
T he might like to re-optimize and extend his holiday. With such re-optimization it is not clear that many
workers return to work at the kink in the budget constraint. In other words, how can the worker commit to
starting a job at time T ? Note also that in our model, the worker commits by signing a contract that specifies
his starting date on the job.
5 A third explanation that is sometimes offered assumes heterogeneity in the dynamic search model. Sup-
pose there are two groups of workers optimizing search intensity (and reservation wages) that face expiring
benefits. One group has a very high offer arrival rate but faces a wage offer distribution with very low wages,
so that they almost never accept job offers until benefits have expired after which they can quickly find a job.
For the other group offers are rarer but wages are higher so their job finding rate is much smoother with only
a small increase at the point of benefit exhaustion. In such a world a lot of individuals from the first group
would exit at benefit exhaustion, leading to a spike at that point. Thus, the spike will be explained purely by
heterogeneity not relying on strategic delays. Nevertheless, also this variant of the dynamic search model
fails to explain why there would be a difference between transition to a permanent and temporary job. It is
difficult to imagine that jobs with very low wages are also permanent jobs while jobs with high wages are
temporary jobs.
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2.1 Delay
Consider a firm that has found a worker with productivity q. This worker yields a
surplus to the firm equal to s(q) with s′(q) > 0. Typically, s(q) will be of the form
q − w(q) where the wage increases with q but w′(q) < 1.
Let l denote the length of the contract that the firm offers the worker and τ the
period for which the worker would like to postpone actually starting to work. Then
the discounted value for the firm of accepting this worker can be written as






s(q)e−ρt dt = s(q)
ρ
e−ρτ (1 − e−ρl) (1)
where ρ denotes the discount rate. We assume here that the firm has work for a period
l independent of when this is done.6
Suppose the worker insists on a delay of τ periods, then this is only acceptable to
the firm if V (q, τ ) exceeds the outside option O for the firm. One way to think of the
outside option is that the firm can draw a new job applicant at cost c. This will yield
O = −c + E(V (q˜, τ˜ )) where the expectation is over the quality and required delay
of the next worker. It turns out that we do not need to know much about the outside
option O to derive our results. Hence we do not introduce specific assumptions on
how search for a new match takes place if negotiations with the currently matched
employee break down.
For concreteness, we assume that the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the firm about the starting date for the job.7 Further we assume that the wage cannot
be varied with τ . This can be justified in two ways. First, the wage may be given to
the firm by an agreement with the labor unions. Second, if the wage is determined
by bilateral bargaining between firm and employee, the employee may not be able to
commit to a wage before starting the job. That is, if the worker agrees to a low wage (in
return for a high τ ), he will renegotiate the wage once he starts the job. Hence the firm
assumes that it will pay the employee this (renegotiated) wage anyway, independent
of τ . For our purposes we do not need to specify how the wage is determined exactly.
We only assume w ∈ 〈b, q〉 where b denotes the unemployment benefit level. Nash
bargaining between worker and firm will give this result.
Further, we assume that the worker when asking for a delay of τ periods does not
know q.8 Hence the probability that the firm rejects τ is given by
6 Alternatively, we can assume that the job involves seasonal work, that needs to be finished before a certain
date l, say the end of the summer. In that case, the second integral is from τ to l. One can verify that similar
results hold in this case. Clearly, also in this case V ′τ < 0: delaying the start of the job reduces the firm’s
profits as production and profit opportunities are destroyed.
7 Clearly, other assumptions would work here as well. The important point is that in negotiation with the
firm the worker feels some restriction in delaying the start of the job out of fear that V (q, τ ) < O . See
footnote 12.
8 Alternatively, we can assume that the worker knows his own productivity q but not the outside option O
of the firm.
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1 − e−ρl e
ρτ
)
where H(.) denotes the distribution function of s(q).
Hence we find9
G ′τ (τ, l) = h
(
ρO




1 − e−ρl e
ρτ > 0
G ′l(τ, l) = −h
((
ρO








Delaying the starting date of the job makes it more likely that the firm will look for
another worker. Longer contracts make it more likely that a firm accepts a given delay
τ . We further assume that h(.) is such that G ′′τ l < 0 and G ′′ττ > 0. For example, if
s(q) is uniformly distributed with a constant density h, we indeed have
G ′′τ l = −h
ρ3 O
(1 − e−ρl)2 e
ρτ < 0
G ′′ττ = h
ρ3 O
1 − e−ρl e
ρτ > 0
Now consider a worker who is matched with a firm. The worker’s wage in this firm
is given by w.10 The worker proposes to delay the starting date by τ periods. Delay τ
is given by the solution to
max
t
(1 − G(t, l))Ve(t, l, σ ) + G(t, l)Vu(σ ) (2)
where Ve denotes the value of having a job with the starting date postponed t peri-
ods. We focus on the case where (temporary and permanent) job opportunities satisfy
Ve(t, l, σ ) > Vu(σ ). Hence the solution to Eq. (2) does not imply G(τ, l) = 1. The
value Ve satisfies






we−ρsds + e−ρ(l+t)ρVu(σ ) + v(t, σ ) (3)
9 To ease notation, we do not assume that the outside option depends on l. In fact, we could make this
assumption. As long as the signs on the derivatives of G below are unchanged, this has no effect on our
analysis.
10 If the wage will be determined by (re)negotiation after the worker has actually started to work, the worker
does not know w exactly as he does not know q. In this case, w denotes the expected wage.
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where the utility (in terms of leisure or home production) of delay is given by v(t, σ ).11
We assume v′t , v′σ > 0 and v′′t t < 0, v′′tσ > 0, v′′′t tσ < 0. In words, σ determines the
preference for delay. The higher σ the higher the utility and marginal utility of delay.
Finally, v′′tσ falls with t . We refer to σ as the value of leisure or home production.
After l + t periods, the worker loses his job and is unemployed again (which gives
him an expected discounted value ρVu(σ )). We assume that these discounted effects
are rather small in the following sense:






> 0 is close to zero (4)
ρV ′′eσ l = −e−ρ(l+t)ρ2V ′u(σ ) < 0 is close to zero (5)






< 0 is close to zero (6)
ρV ′′eσ t = −ρ2e−ρ(l+t)V ′u(σ ) + v′′tσ > 0 (7)
ρV ′′eσ t t = ρ3e−ρ(l+t)V ′u(σ ) + v′′′t tσ < 0 (8)
Although this looks a bit technical, it simply says that the effects over t + l periods
are small and dominated by the direct effects of v(t, σ ). This seems a reasonable
assumption.
The trade off described in Eq. (2) is between increasing the utility Ve if the firm
accepts the delay (which happens with probability 1−G) and increasing the probability
of being rejected in which case the worker continues to be unemployed with expected
discounted value Vu . We assume that d(Ve(t, l, σ ) − Vu(σ ))/dσ < 0. In words, the
higher the value of leisure or home production, the smaller the value of employment
compared to unemployment. A search and matching framework will give this intuitive
result. However, again, we do not need much structure on Vu and Ve and hence do not
specify how they are determined exactly by the working of the labor market.
The first order condition for (an interior solution for the) optimal delay τ can be
written as follows.
G ′τ (Vu − Ve) + (1 − G)V ′eτ = 0 (9)
where V ′eτ = e−ρτ (b−w)+ (w−ρVu(σ ))e−ρ(l+τ) +v′τ . Note that G ′τ , Ve −Vu, (1−
G) > 0 imply that V ′eτ > 0. Because delaying the starting date increases the risk of
being rejected for the job, the worker asks for less than optimal delay in the sense that
at the margin an increase in τ (still) raises Ve.12
We can now derive the following result.
11 We assume that the worker signs a labor contract stipulating a starting day for the job. Hence we do
not allow the worker to use the delay period to search for a better job. Allowing this would increase the
size of the spike for the following two reasons. First, delay periods then become cumulative. Second, delay
becomes more valuable for the worker giving a higher incentive to bargain for delays.
12 This also explains why we need to introduce a firm side to our story. If the employee could choose the
delay τ without any restriction, he would choose τ such that V ′eτ = 0. The solution to this equation only
varies with l because of the effect at l + τ . Because of discounting, this effect is likely to be close to zero.
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Proposition 1 Assume the optimization problem given by (2) has an interior solution







Proof of Proposition 1 For an interior solution, the second order condition implies
that
|soc| = −soc = −G ′′ττ (Vu − Ve) + 2G ′τ V ′eτ − (1 − G)V ′′eττ > 0






+ (1 − G)V ′′eτσ > 0 (10)
|soc|dτ
dl
= −G ′τ V ′el − G ′′τ l(Ve − Vu) − G ′l V ′eτ + (1 − G)V ′′eτ l > 0 (11)
where the first inequality follows from G ′τ > 0, d(Ve − Vu)/dσ < 0 and assumption
(7). The second inequality follows from G ′′τ l , G ′l < 0, V ′eτ > 0 and assumptions (4)
and (6). unionsq
Hence workers with a higher σ postpone the starting date for a longer period. This
happens for two reasons. First, they get a higher utility from delaying the starting date.
Second, even if their proposal is rejected and they lose the job, this is not too bad for
them as the loss Ve − Vu is decreasing in σ .
Jobs with a longer tenure period lead to longer delays in starting the job. This hap-
pens for two related reasons. First, higher l makes it more likely that the firm accepts
the delay (that is, G ′l < 0). Second, increasing τ increases the probability that the firm
rejects the employee’s offer, but at a lower rate as l increases (G ′′τ l < 0). There are
two effects going in the opposite direction. First, higher l implies that the job is worth
more, as the drop in income from w to the value of unemployment ρVu happens fur-
ther away in the future. This increases the loss if the employee’s offer of τ is rejected
(V ′el > 0) and may reduce τ . Second, higher l reduces the benefit of postponing the
start of the job (V ′′eτ l < 0). This is again due to the effect at τ + l. However, since these
are effects in the future, discounting reduces the size of these effects. If the effects are
small enough, they are dominated by the first two effects.
Finally, we can show the following.




Proof of Proposition 2 A sufficient condition for d2τdσdl < 0 is that d(−G ′τ V ′el −
G ′′τ l(Ve −Vu)−G ′l V ′eτ + (1−G)V ′′eτ l)/dσ < 0 while d|soc|/dσ > 0. Let us consider
each condition in turn. First,
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−G ′τ V ′′elσ + G ′′τ l
d(Vu − Ve)
dσ
− G ′l V ′′eτσ + (1 − G)V ′′′eτ lσ < 0
because of assumptions (5) and V ′′eτσ , V ′′′eτ lσ close to zero together with G ′′τ l <




+ 2G ′τ V ′′eτσ − (1 − G)V ′′′eττσ > 0
as G ′′ττ
d(Ve−Vu)
dσ is assumed to be small, G
′
τ > 0 and assumptions (7) and (8). unionsq
Hence we see that higher σ employees delay more (for each l). And for higher σ
the effect of l on τ becomes smaller. If it is correct to assume that women have a higher
value of home production (e.g. because they are not breadwinner), this result explains
the findings below that women postpone more jobs (both temporary and permanent)
and the differential effect between temporary and permanent jobs is smaller in terms
of delay.
The conditions in the proposition are sufficient and not necessary. Although, the
conditions are rather technical, they have the following interpretation. We know that
dτ/dl > 0 and we want to understand when this derivative is smaller as σ goes up.
There are three effects going against this. First, V ′′eτσ > 0: higher σ leads to a higher
marginal value of delay. This tends to raise dτ/dl as higher l decreases the probability
that the match is dissolved. Second V ′′′eτ lσ > 0: longer term contracts are more valuable
to postpone as σ goes up (that is, V ′′eτ l < 0 increases with σ ). This tends to raise dτ/dl
as well. Third, if G ′′ττ > 0 (which is the case above if the worker does not know q and
H is uniform), an increase in σ makes the problem less concave, as the loss Ve − Vu
falls with σ . This makes the agent’s problem more elastic and tends to blow up dτ/dl
as σ increases. Hence we need to assume that these effects are relatively small.
2.2 Spikes
The delay in starting a job, described above, can lead to spikes in the unemployment
outflow rate. Let αl denote the arrival rate of jobs with duration l for an unemployed
worker searching for a job. As said, after T periods the unemployment benefit drops
from b to bs < b. Assume that this induces workers to accept a job without delay.13




−∑ j α j t dt
where τl denotes the solution to Eq. (9).
13 This assumption simplifies the analysis but is by no means necessary. The relevant point is that the drop
from b to bs induces a mass of workers not to postpone the starting date beyond T . That is, we need to
assume that there are workers who would postpone τ periods if the benefit level would remain at b but
who do not postpone beyond T because of the drop in benefit level. This result is reminiscent of the Meyer
(1990) and Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) kinked budget constraint result.
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Proof of Proposition 3 By assumption workers do not postpone starting a job found
after T . Then v′′t t < 0 implies that jobs found at time t < T are never postponed past
T because v′t (T − t, σ ) < v′t (0, σ ).
Hence the outflow at time T is the “sum” (actually “integral”) of workers matched
with l-jobs from time T − τl till T . The stock of “free” workers at time t that can be
matched with an l-job is given by workers who up till then have not been matched
with any job at all: e−
∑
j α j t
. unionsq
We get a spike because people matched over the interval [T − τl , T ] all flow out
of unemployment at the same time T . For given αl , this outflow is bigger, the longer
the delay τl . If the delay τ is zero for a certain type of job, there is—in principle—no
spike.
Summarizing, the theory above leads to the following testable predictions. First,
spikes are higher for permanent than for temporary jobs. If women have a higher value
of home production (σ ) than men, we find that women delay the starting date longer
than men (for both temporary and permanent jobs). Finally, the difference in spike
between permanent and temporary jobs is smaller for women than for men.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
3.1 Data
Like OECD countries, Slovenia provides income support for the unemployed through a
social insurance program that combines unemployment insurance and unemployment
assistance. Benefits under employment insurance are earnings related, with the dura-
tion of entitlement contingent on work experience, with predetermined maximum and
minimum levels. Unemployment assistance benefits are means-tested; they are offered
to unemployed who exhausted their eligibility for unemployment insurance, and are
for most workers substantially lower than unemployment insurance benefits.
Our empirical analysis is based on administrative records of unemployment spells,
combined with selected information on formal employment spells.14 Included are all
spells of unemployment benefit recipients which started between August 1, 1997 and
July 31, 1998 and in the calendar year 1999 (with censoring on December 31, 2001).
For each spell, the database contains starting and ending date of registered unemploy-
ment spell, destination of exit, and the information on the receipt of unemployment
insurance benefits (starting and ending date of the eligibility and actual ending date
of the receipt). Personal and family characteristics of recipients are also included. To
improve the information about the end of unemployment spells, a separate source,
work history data set for formal sector workers, was utilized. So, in our dataset the
end of the unemployment spell is defined as the date at which an individual started
working or left the unemployment register for other reasons. The destination “job” is
defined by administrative records as exit to private or public employment, including
self-employment. Other destinations include exits to active labor market programs,
14 The unemployment benefit system and the data are described in more detail in Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2006, 2008).
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voluntary and involuntary removal from registration, and a miscellaneous category
that includes maternity leave, military service and death. Here, we are only inter-
ested in job finding rates. If individuals left unemployment for other reasons their
durations of unemployment are considered to be right-censored. The data we use are
suitable to explore the existence of end of benefit spikes since our data do not only
cover the period when workers were covered by unemployment benefits but also the
period of transition from unemployment to employment after benefits expired. The
date at which individuals started working on a job is not dependent on self-reporting
of the unemployed workers but comes from employers. A unique feature of the Slo-
venian data is that at the start of the post-unemployment job its nature—temporary
or permanent—is registered. Furthermore, we observe how long people stay in their
jobs.
In our analysis we focus on individuals that were entitled to benefits for a maxi-
mum duration of 6, 9 or 12 months. For every unemployed worker after 3 months the
replacement rate was reduced from 70 % of the previous wage to 60 % (subject to a
minimum and maximum). Because the end of benefits effects for some workers coin-
cides with a drop in the replacement rate for all workers, we ignore individuals with a
potential benefit duration of 3 months. Slovenia reformed its unemployment benefits
in 1998; the reform shortened the potential duration of benefits for most groups of
workers. We use data from before and after the reform. The appendix provides more
information about the data.
3.2 Stylized Facts
To illustrate the end of benefits effects, Figs. 1 and 2 show the relationship between
job finding rates and months to benefit expiration for men and women, distinguished
by potential benefit duration.15 There are clear spikes at benefit expiration for each
of the three groups of workers. It is also clear that for temporary jobs there is a spike
at benefit expiration, but in relative terms—compared to the job finding rates 2 or
3 months before benefit expiration—the spikes are considerably smaller than for the
transition rate to permanent jobs.
To get a first impression whether indeed temporary jobs are less likely to generate
benefit expiration spikes in the transition rate than permanent jobs, we did some sim-
ple calculations. For each group of workers with the same potential benefit duration
we divided the permanent job finding rate in the month of benefit expiration by this
rate in the month prior to that. We did the same for the temporary job finding rate.
The first two columns of Table 1 show the outcomes of these calculations. Indeed,
whereas for males the average relative spike for permanent jobs is 3.37, it is only 1.43
for temporary jobs. For females the average relative spike for permanent jobs is 3.91,
while for temporary jobs it is 1.64.
15 The job finding rates are calculated on a monthly basis taking right-censored durations into account. The
same holds for the job separation rates in Fig. 3. Note that we can identify the spikes because they occur at
different unemployment durations for different groups of workers. Otherwise, we could not distinguish the
spike from the effect of duration dependence.
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Fig. 1 Job finding rates close to benefit expiration—men: a permanent jobs, b temporary jobs
The top part of Fig. 3 shows job separation rates for men, distinguished between
temporary jobs and permanent jobs. As was to be expected, the job separation rates
from temporary jobs are much higher as the job separation rates from permanent jobs.
There is a large spike in the job separation rate for temporary jobs at 9 months indi-
cating the importance of fixed-term contracts of that particular duration. Similarly
there are also spikes at 3, 6 and 12 months. The bottom part of Fig. 3 shows the job
separation rates for women which are very similar to those of men. Clearly, individ-
uals on permanent jobs do not leave their jobs quickly; 12 months after starting on a
permanent job 94 % the men and 95 % of the women are still employed. From the
workers on temporary jobs after 1 year 59 % of the men and 66 % of the women is
still employed.
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Fig. 2 Job finding rates close to benefit expiration—women: a permanent jobs, b temporary jobs
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Job Finding Rates
The use of hazard rate models and the data with individuals facing different potential
benefit durations allow us to identify the end-of-benefit spikes. We distinguish between
transition rates to permanent and to temporary jobs and start with a set-up that is in
line with our theoretical model. The rate at which individuals find a permanent or a
temporary job at unemployment duration t conditional on observed characteristics x
and unobserved characteristics u is assumed to have the following specification
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Total <1 year ≥1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Males
6 2.68 1.31 0.79 1.76
9 7.14 1.58 1.39 1.75
12 2.88 1.80 1.18 2.36
Average 3.37 1.43 0.98 1.82
Females
6 3.78 1.39 1.27 1.47
9 2.83 1.71 1.59 1.76
12 10.15 3.18 3.54 3.04
Average 3.91 1.64 1.50 1.71
Note that the average relative spike is calculated as the job finding rate in the month of benefit expiration
divided by the job finding rate in the month previous to that. Also note that the distinction between the
duration of temporary jobs is based on ex post information
θi (t | x, ui ) = λi (t) exp(x ′βi + ui ) for i = p, n (12)
where i indicates the type of job (p = permanent, n = temporary), β is a vector of
parameters and λ represents individual duration dependence, which is modeled in a
flexible way by using step functions:
λi (t) = exp(	kμi,k Ik(t) + δi Is(t)) for i = p, n (13)
where k (=1,…,4) is a subscript for duration interval. We distinguish four intervals,
monthly for the first 3 months, and the fourth interval larger than 3 months. For reasons
of normalization we impose μi,4 = 0. If a period of delay exists, in the job finding
rate concerning permanent jobs at least the initial μ-parameters should be smaller than
zero. For temporary jobs this should not be the case. Furthermore, Is is an indicator for
the month of benefit expiration (s = 6, 9, 12). The μ-parameters measure the pattern
of duration dependence, and δ indicates the size of the spike in the month of benefit
expiration. If the period of delay exists we expect a spike to be present in the job
finding rate for permanent jobs, while such a spike should be less important in the job
finding rate for temporary jobs.
The conditional density function of the completed unemployment duration ti that
ended in a transition towards a job of type i can be written as





(θp(s | x, u p) + θn(s | x, un))ds
⎞
⎠ for i = p, n
(14)
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Fig. 3 Job separation rates—men (a) and women (b)
We assume that the unobservables in both job finding rates are from discrete distribu-
tions with two points of support, which we assume to be perfectly correlated.16 Then,
the joint distribution also has two points of support, p1 and p2
Pr(u p = u p,a, un = un,a) = p1 Pr(u p = u p,b, un = un,b) = p2 (15)
16 We investigated whether it was possible to estimate an extended distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
but we were not able to identify a third mass-point.
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Because the hazard rates also contain constant terms, we normalize u p,a = un,a = 0.
The discrete distribution is supposed to have a logit specification with p1 = exp(α)1+exp(α)
and p2 = 11+exp(α) . We remove the unobserved components by taking expectations:
f (tp, tn | x) = Eu p Eun [ f p(tp | x, u p). fn(tn | x, un)] (16)
The parameters are estimated with the method of maximum likelihood, taking into
account that some durations are right-censored.
The analyses are done separately for males and females to account for possible
differences in labor market behavior. In addition to this distinction by gender the
effect of the following personal characteristics are taken into account: age, education,
family situation, health, and calendar period of inflow into unemployment (see the
appendix for details).
Panel a of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the baseline model. Age has
a negative effect on all job findings rates. Education has a positive effect on the job
finding rate concerning permanent jobs but has no effect on the rate by which indi-
viduals find temporary jobs; with the exception of higher educated males who have a
smaller transition rate to temporary jobs. Family conditions do not affect the transition
rate to temporary jobs, but the effect for permanent jobs differs for males and females.
Concerning permanent jobs, males who have dependent family members have a higher
job finding rate than males who do not, but females with dependent family members
have a lower job finding rate than other females. Bad health reduces all job finding
rates substantially.
There is also evidence of unobservables affecting the job finding rates. Conditional
on the observable characteristics and the elapsed duration of unemployment there is
a group of 87 % of the males that has a high job finding rate both to permanent and
temporary jobs, while the remaining 13 % has substantially lower job finding rates.
For women these percentages are 83 for the group with high job finding rates and 17
for the group with low job finding rates.
The pattern of duration dependence is different for permanent jobs and temporary
jobs. For permanent jobs the job finding rate is low in the first months of the unem-
ployment spell, which is support for the existence of a delay period. The transition
rate to temporary jobs in the first months is higher than later on.
The most important parameter estimates refer to the spike in job findings rates at
benefit exhaustion. This spike is identified by comparing the job finding rate in the
month of benefit expiration for some groups of workers with the identical non-expira-
tion month for other groups of workers. It appears that there are substantial spikes. The
job finding rate concerning permanent jobs in a month of benefit expiration is about 3
times as high for men and 3.7 times as high for women as in the same month without
benefit expiration. Also in the transition rates to temporary jobs we find spikes, which
are about 50 % (men) to 75 % (women) higher than regular job finding rates. The
difference between the spikes in the job finding rates between permanent and tem-
porary jobs supports our theoretical model. Apparently for temporary jobs delaying
acceptance is more difficult. Hence the spike is smaller.
Panel b of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the spike if we impose that
there is no duration dependence. There is a clear drop in the log-likelihood value from
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Table 2 Parameter estimates job finding rates—baseline model
Males Females
Permanent job Temporary job Permanent job Temporary job
(a) Baseline model
Age/10 −0.53 (5.3)** −0.46 (7.9)** −0.35 (3.3)** −0.50 (8.9)**
Educ2 0.11 (0.5) −0.03 (0.3) 1.19 (2.5)** −0.02 (0.2)
Educ3 0.55 (2.7)** −0.13 (1.4) 1.64 (3.5)** −0.15 (1.3)
Educ4 0.87 (4.2)** −0.44 (4.5)** 2.13 (4.6)** −0.13 (1.2)
Family1 0.12 (1.4) −0.00 (0.0) −0.26 (2.8)** 0.06 (1.0)
Family2 0.16 (2.0)* 0.01 (0.2) −0.24 (2.8)** 0.01 (0.3)
Bad health −2.25 (12.5)** −1.81 (21.7)** −2.21 (8.8)** −2.09 (19.0)**
Group 2 0.05 (0.4) 0.15 (1.7)* 0.26 (2.0)** 0.03 (0.3)
Group 3 0.19 (1.3) 0.27 (2.9)** 0.17 (1.2) 0.24 (2.8)**
Group 4 0.09 (0.6) 0.23 (2.4)** 0.26 (1.7)* 0.08 (0.8)
Group 5 0.54 (3.3)** 0.42 (4.2)** 0.29 (1.8)* 0.47 (5.1)**
Group 6 0.71 (3.8)** 0.56 (4.8)** 0.51 (2.6)** 0.73 (6.6)**
Constant −6.00 (17.6)** −4.46 (22.8)** −8.15 (14.8)** −4.62 (23.0)**
First months
Month 1 −0.63 (5.0)** 0.17 (2.9)** −0.21 (1.7)* 0.32 (5.8)**
Month 2 −0.39 (3.2)** 0.12 (2.0)** −0.12 (1.0) 0.08 (1.2)
Month 3 −0.29 (2.4)** 0.45 (8.0)** −0.07 (0.6) 0.21 (3.6)**
Spike 1.09 (11.8)** 0.42 (5.5)** 1.32 (14.6)** 0.55 (8.4)**
Unobs. heterogeneity
Masspoint 2 −7.66 (17.3)** −9.91 (2.4)** −9.99 (15.2)** −∞
α 1.89 (12.9)** 1.61 (19.1)**
Loglikelihood 29,289.0 32,148.1
(b) No initial drop
Spike 1.30 (14.7)** 0.35 (4.6)** 1.39 (16.0)** 0.47 (7.3)**
Loglikelihood 29,331.9 32,168.1
(c) Extended model
Spike 1.63 (11.3)** 0.59 (6.1)** 1.60 (11.6)** 0.66 (7.8)**
Loglikelihood 29,216.3 32,140.3
Observations 5,583 6,478
Absolute t statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates significance at a 95 % (90 %) level
which we conclude that we cannot reject the pattern of duration dependence found in
panel a.
Panel c of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the spike if we introduce a
very flexible specification of duration dependence with monthly intervals for the first
6 months, and after that the intervals 6–9, 10–12, 13–18 months and 18+months. Fur-
thermore, we introduce an indicator for benefit expiration because individuals may
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increase their search intensity after benefits have expired.17 As shown the spike in
the job finding rate for permanent jobs is substantially larger than for temporary jobs.
However, as in the baseline estimates we cannot ignore the existence of a benefit spike
in the exits to temporary jobs.
4.2 Job Separation Rates
The type of post-unemployment jobs is registered as being permanent or fixed-term,
which we interpret as being temporary. The nature of the job is labeled at the start, but
permanent jobs may not last long and temporary contracts may be extended so that
temporary jobs may last quite some time.
To investigate the determinants of job separations we estimate a proportional haz-
ard model where the job separation rate from jobs of type i at employment duration t
conditional on observed variables x and unobserved characteristics v
θ si (t | x) = λsi (t) exp(x ′βsi + z′γ si + vi ) for i = p, n (17)
where z is a vector of variables that indicate when the unemployed left unemploy-
ment—the month of unemployment and whether or not it was the last month of benefits
before expiration. Furthermore, βs and γ s are vectors of parameters, and λs represents
individual duration dependence, which is again modeled in a flexible way by using
step functions:
λsi (t) = exp(	kμsi,k Ik(t)) (18)
where k (=1,…,10) is a subscript for duration interval and we consider the following
ten intervals: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7–9, 10–12, 13–18, 18+. For reasons of normalization
we impose μsi,1 = 0. The conditional density function of completed job durations and
the likelihood function are set-up as before. As with the job finding rates also for the
job separation rates we assume that the unobservables are from discrete distributions
with two points of support, which we assume to be perfectly correlated.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 3. The duration of permanent jobs
for males is affected by their age, education and health. Older, lower educated males
with bad health have a higher job separation rates than their counterparts. For females
the separation rate form permanent jobs is not affected by any personal characteristic.
The duration of temporary jobs is only affected by age and family situation. Older
individuals are more likely to loose their temporary job quickly. The effect of family
situation differs for males and females. Whereas males with 1 dependent family mem-
ber are more likely to loose their temporary job, females with 2 or more dependent
family members are less likely to loose their job.
Remarkably, for permanent jobs the duration doesn’t depend on the previous unem-
ployment spell. It doesn’t matter whether an unemployed worker finds a permanent
17 Note also that we can still identify δ because the spike occurs at different unemployment durations.
If not, we could not distinguish the spike from the effect of duration dependence.
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Table 3 Parameter estimates job separation rates—baseline model
Males Females
Permanent job Temporary job Permanent job Temporary job
Age/10 0.48 (3.4)** 0.36 (4.3)** 0.15 (0.9) 0.31 (3.9)**
Educ2 −0.41 (1.4) 0.23 (1.9)* −0.44 (0.5) −0.13 (0.8)
Educ3 −0.72 (2.6)** 0.04 (0.3) −0.60 (0.7) −0.10 (0.7)
Educ4 −0.96 (3.3)** 0.01 (0.1) −0.75 (0.9) −0.22 (1.3)
Family1 −0.15 (1.0) 0.25 (3.3)** 0.13 (0.9) −0.02 (0.2)
Family2 −0.08 (0.6) 0.01 (0.1) −0.13 (0.9) −0.11 (1.7)*
Bad health 0.56 (2.0)** 0.19 (1.6) 0.58 (1.6) 0.17 (0.9)
Month 2 0.01 (0.0) 0.12 (1.0) −0.49 (1.1) 0.23 (1.8)*
Month 3 0.50 (1.4) 0.52 (4.7)** 0.34 (1.0) 0.64 (5.1)**
Month 4 −0.38 (0.8) 0.10 (0.8) −0.45 (1.0) 0.51 (3.9)**
Month 5 −0.03 (0.1) 0.21 (1.7)* −0.59 (1.3) 0.88 (7.2)**
Month 6 −0.18 (0.4) 0.25 (2.0)** −0.09 (0.2) 0.44 (3.2)**
Month 7–9 0.14 (0.4) 0.41 (3.9)** −0.06 (0.2) 0.07 (0.6)
Month 10–12 0.15 (0.5) 0.29 (2.6)** −0.13 (0.4) 0.31 (2.4)**
Month 13–18 −0.09 (0.3) −0.36 (3.0)** 0.02 (0.1) 0.02 (1.2)
Month 18+ −0.05 (0.2) −0.39 (3.0)** −0.21 (0.7) −0.19 (1.3)
After expiration −0.10 (0.3) −0.09 (0.6) −0.08 (0.3) 0.32 (2.1)**
Left unemployment
Month 2 0.06 (0.2) −0.67 (6.8)** −0.07 (0.3) −0.47 (4.3)**
Month 3 0.19 (0.8) −0.53 (5.3)** 0.12 (0.4) −0.24 (2.1)**
Month 4 0.09 (0.4) −0.67 (6.0)** 0.06 (0.2) −0.39 (3.2)**
Month 5 0.05 (0.2) −0.43 (3.7)** 0.32 (1.1) −0.27 (2.1)**
Month 6 −0.42 (1.3) −0.76 (5.0)** −0.07 (0.2) −0.52 (3.6)**
Month 7–9 −0.26 (0.9) −0.62 (4.9)** 0.18 (0.6) −0.59 (4.5)**
Month 10–12 −0.06 (0.2) −0.61 (3.6)** −0.02 (0.1) −0.72 (4.1)**
Month 13–18 0.07 (0.2) −0.58 (2.8)** 0.07 (0.2) −0.56 (2.9)**
Month 18+ −0.11 (0.2) −0.47 (2.0)** 0.39 (0.9) −0.59 (2.9)**
In “spike” month −0.35 (2.3)** −0.26 (2.0)** 0.08 (0.3) 0.01 (0.1)
Constant −7.87 (13.5)** −7.05 (24.8)** −7.03 (6.8)** −6.95 (24.2)**
Masspoint 2 – −∞ – −∞
α – 1.50 (11.4)** – 1.41 (6.9)**
Observations 1,027 2,973 939 3,307
Not reported are the parameter estimates related dummy variables for each of the 6 groups of unemployed;
absolute t statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates significance at a 95 % (90 %) level
job early on in the unemployment spell or much later, the job separation rate is equally
high. For females it is irrelevant whether or not the unemployed worker finds a per-
manent job in the month of benefit expiration. Apparently, it is not just the “strong”
worker that postpones her start until the moment at which benefits expire. This is sup-
port for our hypothesis that it is the delay in acceptance which is driving the benefit
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spike. For temporary jobs the previous unemployment spell has some importance.
Especially workers that find a temporary job in the first month of their unemployment
spell are more likely to loose this job quickly. Males that find a job in the month of
benefit expiration are less likely to loose this job quickly. This could point at reverse
causality. Males that have the opportunity to start on a long term job are more likely to
postpone this start until the month of benefit expiration. Again, this would be support
for our delay theory.
Concerning unobserved heterogeneity the results are different for permanent jobs
and temporary jobs. Whereas for permanent jobs we found no indication of unobserved
heterogeneity, for temporary jobs we do find that unobserved heterogeneity affects the
separation rate. Most temporary jobs exist only shortly but there are also temporary
jobs which last very long. Conditional on the observed characteristics, the unemploy-
ment history and the duration of the employment spell there is a group of temporary
jobs of 82 % for males (80 % for females) that last short, while the complementary
18 % (20 % for females) lasts very long.
4.3 Temporary Jobs
4.3.1 Finding and Separating
The relationship between the benefit expiration spike and the duration of the first job
may be affected by correlation between unobservables in the job finding rate and the
job separation rate. To investigate this we estimate a bivariate duration model with
correlated error terms. We do the estimates for temporary jobs, separately for males
and females.
In both the job finding rate for temporary jobs and the job separation rate from
temporary jobs we introduce unobserved heterogeneity. Both rates are now specified
as
θn(t | x, un) = λ(t) exp(x ′βn + un) (19)
θ sn(t | x, usn) = λs(t) exp(x ′βsn + z′γ s + usn) (20)
where un and usn represent unobserved heterogeneity. As before, we assume that the
unobservables in both the job finding rate and the job separation rate are from discrete
distributions with two points of support which are integrated out of the likelihood
specification.
The main parameter estimates are summarized in Table 4. As shown the second
mass points are negative for the job finding rate and positive for the job separation
rate. Conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed durations of the
unemployment and employment spells individuals that have a low job finding rate
also have a high job separation rate. If it takes a long time to find a job, the job found
doesn’t last very long. However, the size of the benefit exhaustion spikes are not influ-
enced by the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity. They are almost identical to
the ones presented in Table 2.
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Table 4 Parameter estimates job finding and separation rates—temporary jobs
Males Females
2nd masspoint
Job finding −0.76 (2.9)** −0.95 (2.3)**
Job separation 2.56 (14.6)** 2.47 (4.7)**
Spike 0.56 (6.0)** 0.67 (7.7)**
α −1.02 (4.5)** −1.39 (2.5)**
N 5,529 6,433
Note that the number of observations is smaller than in the estimates of Table 2 because for males (females)
54 (45) the duration at the job (either completed or incomplete) is missing are therefore these individu-
als are removed from the sample. Not reported are the other parameter estimates; absolute t-statistics in
parentheses; a ** (*) indicates significance at a 95 % (90 %) level
4.3.2 The Duration of Temporary Jobs Reconsidered
Our theory predicts that there is a positive correlation between the expected duration of
a job and the size of the benefit expiration spike. We showed that indeed for permanent
jobs there is a larger spike in the job finding rate than for temporary jobs. However,
there is a large variation in the duration of temporary jobs. Some ex ante temporary
jobs turn out to be ex post long employment spells. Our theory also predicts that the
benefit expiration spike should be bigger for long temporary jobs.
To investigate a first impression whether indeed shorter temporary jobs are less
likely to generate benefit expiration spikes in the transition rate to these jobs, as before
we calculated the relative spike as the job finding rate in the month of benefit expi-
ration divided by the job finding rate in the month previous to that.18 The results
of these calculations are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. For males with
a potential benefit duration of 6 months the relative spike for short-term temporary
jobs is 0.79, i.e. there is no spike at all. For the same category of workers the relative
spike for long-term temporary jobs equals 1.76. On average there is no relative spike
for short-term jobs while the relative spike for long-term jobs is 1.82. These findings
confirm our theoretical model. For females the results are less clear. On average there
are spikes for short-term temporary jobs and for long-term temporary jobs. The last
type of spike is larger than the first type but the differences are small. This is consistent
with our results (in Propositions 1 and 2) that for workers with higher value of home
production (assuming this is the case for women) both types of jobs are postponed
and the difference in delay is smaller (compared to workers with lower σ ).
4.4 The Slovenian Labor Market Reconsidered
An important issue that may arise when analyzing the Slovenian labor market is the
interpretation of behavior of workers in relation to the informal sector. Vodopivec
18 Note that some job durations were right censored with a duration less than 1 year. This causes a bias in
the calculations for jobs that lasted less than 1 year.
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Table 5 Parameter estimates spikes—before and after the 1998 reform
Permanent jobs Temporary jobs Observations
Males
Before 1.51 (8.4)** 0.58 (4.5)** 2,741
After 1.89 (6.6)** 0.51 (2.9)** 2,842
Total 1.63 (11.3)** 0.59 (6.1)** 5,583
Females
Before 1.56 (9.4)** 0.72 (6.4)** 3,119
After 1.61 (5.2)** 0.61 (4.0)** 3,359
Total 1.60 (11.6)** 0.66 (7.8)** 6,478
The “total” estimates are the same as those reported in Table 2 panel c; absolute t-statistics in parentheses;
a ** (*) indicates significance at a 95 % (90 %) level
(1995) indicates that in the early 1990s unemployed workers is Slovenia might have
collected unemployment compensation and work at the same time under informal
employment. Vodopivec claims that during 1990–1992 there was a tendency among
the recipients of unemployment benefits in Slovenia to stay unemployed until their
benefits expired before taking a job. If so, benefit exhaustion spikes would not have
much to do with delay behavior as we claim. Instead, they would simply reflect the
end of a waiting for benefits to expire period. Nevertheless, Slovenian legislators in
1993 and 1994 enacted several laws to prevent this type of waiting behavior from
happening. In 1998, there was a major reform of unemployment benefits drastically
reducing the potential benefit duration, roughly by half for most groups of recipients.
As indicated by Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), the 1998 reform also called for
several measures aimed at speeding up benefit recipients’ reemployment, including
improvement in employment services, the obligatory preparation of a reemployment
plan for each benefit recipient, and more frequent contact between counselors and
recipients. Furthermore, reform called for stricter monitoring of eligibility. Benefit
recipients had to make themselves available to employment office counselors several
hours a day. For the first time, inspectors (a special arm of employment offices) would
check to see if benefit recipients were in fact unemployed (inter alia, by paying home
visits to benefit recipients) and actively searching for a job. To the extent that collect-
ing benefits and working in the informal sector until benefits expire was an issue, this
should have been more prevalent before the 1998 reform. Tougher monitoring of the
unemployment status accompanied by occasional benefit sanctions should have ruled
out a lot of this type of abuse. Nevertheless, to investigate this issue in more detail we
performed separate estimates on data collected before and after the reform. Table 5
shows the relevant parameter estimates. Clearly there is no tendency for exhaustion
spikes in the job finding rates to be smaller after the reform. And, the difference in the
size of the spikes between permanent jobs and temporary jobs is present as much after
the reform as it was before the reform. From this we conclude that although we cannot
rule out some influence of the informal sector, this doesn’t seem to be an important
explanation for the existence of the end-of-benefit spikes.
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5 Conclusions
Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a “spike”
in the job finding rate just before benefit exhaustion. This phenomenon may not be
important from a quantitative point of view since it occurs when many unemployed
have already left unemployment, but it does raise the question why it occurs.
Our study presents a theoretical model in which the nature of the job affects the
size of the end-of-benefit spike. In our model, spikes in the job finding rates are caused
by delays between job finding and the start of the job. Workers prefer to delay and
make an offer to the firm about the starting date for the job. The firm will only accept a
delay if the value of the job including delay is larger than the value of searching for a
new worker, who may (also) have a preference for delay. When workers decide about
their offer to the firm they take into account that the firm might reject the offer if the
delay is too long. They also take into account that long-lasting jobs have more value
to the firm so for these jobs employers are more likely to accept longer delays. From
our theoretical model we derive that delays are more likely to occur for permanent
jobs than for temporary jobs. Our model assumes that workers who have found a job
will never delay the start of the job beyond the expiration date of their benefits, since
that would be too costly. This causes many unemployed to leave unemployment at
benefit exhaustion thus causing a spike in the job finding rate. Since the delay period
is longer the size of the end-of-benefit spike will be larger for permanent jobs than for
temporary jobs. We investigate the validity of our model using Slovenian unemploy-
ment data which have the unique feature that the temporary or permanent nature of
the post-unemployment job is registered. Indeed, we find that spikes are more likely
to occur in transitions from unemployment to permanent jobs. From this, we con-
clude that end-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior
of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in
starting date of a new job. Thus the spikes in the job finding rate suggests that workers
exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.
Our paper also makes a theoretical contribution. Previous studies refer to two alter-
native explanation for the existence of such a spike. First, a static labor supply model
in which a kink in the budget constraint causes many individuals to choose the same
benefit duration. Second, a non-stationary search model in which the job finding rate
is slowly increasing due to increasing search intensity and falling reservation wages.
In neither of the two models the nature of the job is important. Our theoretical model is
not intended to replace existing theories of job search. We introduce a new element in
job acceptance behavior that enriches traditional job search theory by showing that the
nature of the job may influence behavior as workers get closer to benefit exhaustion.
Appendix: Variables Used in the Analysis
In the analysis we use the following variables:
• Age: continuous variable
• Education: dummy variables, Education2 = elementary school, Education3 =
vocational school, Education4 = high school or more, reference group = unfin-
ished elementary school
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Table 6 Means of variables
Males Females Males Females
Age/10 3.24 3.16 Group 2 0.19 0.18
Educ2 0.27 0.23 Group 3 0.16 0.18
Educ3 0.42 0.32 Group 4 0.23 0.20
Educ4 0.26 0.41 Group 5 0.18 0.18
Reference 0.05 0.04 Group 6 0.17 0.17
Reference 0.07 0.09
Family1 0.20 0.26
Family2 0.28 0.42 Permanent job
Reference 0.52 0.32 Completed duration 0.35 0.36
Incomplete duration 0.65 0.64
Bad health 0.08 0.06
Reference 0.92 0.94 Temporary job
Completed duration 0.66 0.60
Temporary job 0.54 0.51 Incomplete duration 0.34 0.40
Permanent job 0.18 0.14
Incomplete spell 0.28 0.34 Observations 5,583 6,478
• Family situation: dummy variables, Family1 = 1 dependent family member,
Family2 = more than 1 dependent family member, reference group = no dependent
family members
• Ill health: Dummy variable derived from information obtained by employment
office councilors from interviews with benefit recipients
• Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) and time of entrance into unemployment (before
or after the policy change): 5 dummy variables, Group 2 = PBD of 9 months,
entrance before, Group 3 = PBD of 6 months, entrance after, Group 4 = PBD
of 12 months, entrance before, Group 5 = PBD of 6 months, entrance after,
Group 6 = PBD of 9 months, entrance after; reference group = PBD of 6 months,
entrance before.
The characteristics of our dataset are presented in Table 6.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
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